Rediseño y mudanza
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Estreno diseño y dirección. A partir de ahora, el blog se podrá leer en
http://www.andaryver.mx/
Hace 10 años
29.4.10
23.4.10
Palabras de JEP, Premio Cervantes 2009
"Para volver al plano de la realidad irreal o de la irrealidad real en que los personajes del Quijote pueden ser al mismo tiempo lectores del Quijote, me gustaría que el Premio Cervantes hubiera sido para Cervantes. Cómo hubiera aliviado sus últimos años el recibirlo. Se sabe que el inmenso éxito de su libro en poco o nada remedió su penuria."
20.4.10
JEP
La palabra greed gruñe.
La palabra codicia tiene garras, tentáculos.
La palabra ambición
va suelta por el mundo con las fauces abiertas.
La palabra codicia tiene garras, tentáculos.
La palabra ambición
va suelta por el mundo con las fauces abiertas.
14.4.10
"If you want to succed, rise your error rate"
In fact, industrial policy never went out of fashion. Economists enamored of the neo-liberal Washington Consensus may have written it off, but successful economies have always relied on government policies that promote growth by accelerating structural transformation.
13.4.10
Economic Policy: Lessons from History
At the 43rd Annual Alexander Hamilton Awards Dinner, where was honoring with the Hamilton Award, Ben Bernanke drew four relevant lessons from the financial collapse of the 1930s:
1) Economic prosperity depends on financial stability
2) Policymakers must respond forcefully, creatively, and decisively to severe financial crises - e.g. SCAP
3) International crises require and international response
4) History is never perfect guide – "History does not repeat itself, but it can rhyme"
2) Policymakers must respond forcefully, creatively, and decisively to severe financial crises - e.g. SCAP
3) International crises require and international response
4) History is never perfect guide – "History does not repeat itself, but it can rhyme"
12.4.10
The Field of Economic History
En El Placer de Disentir encontré la postura de Rogoff sobre "The Field of Economic History"
Sobre el mismo tema hace unos meses DeLong escribió en Project-Syndicate "The Anti-History Boys"
"If you asked a modern economic historian like me why the world is currently in the grips of a financial crisis and a deep economic downturn, I would tell you that this is the latest episode in a long history of similar bubbles, crashes, crises, and recessions that date back at least to the canal-building bubble of the early 1820's, the 1825-1826 failure of Pole, Thornton & Co, and the subsequent first industrial recession in Britain. We have seen this process at work in many other historical episodes as well – in 1870, 1890, 1929, and 2000."
"But if you ask the same question of a modern macroeconomist – for example, the extremely bright Narayana Kocherlakota of the University of Minnesota – you will find that he says that he does not know, and that macroeconomic models attribute economic downturns to various causes. Most, he points out, “rely on some form of large quarterly movements in the technological frontier. Some have collective shocks to the marginal utility of leisure. Other models have large quarterly shocks to the depreciation rate in the capital stock (in order to generate high asset price volatilities)..."
Sobre el mismo tema hace unos meses DeLong escribió en Project-Syndicate "The Anti-History Boys"
"If you asked a modern economic historian like me why the world is currently in the grips of a financial crisis and a deep economic downturn, I would tell you that this is the latest episode in a long history of similar bubbles, crashes, crises, and recessions that date back at least to the canal-building bubble of the early 1820's, the 1825-1826 failure of Pole, Thornton & Co, and the subsequent first industrial recession in Britain. We have seen this process at work in many other historical episodes as well – in 1870, 1890, 1929, and 2000."
"But if you ask the same question of a modern macroeconomist – for example, the extremely bright Narayana Kocherlakota of the University of Minnesota – you will find that he says that he does not know, and that macroeconomic models attribute economic downturns to various causes. Most, he points out, “rely on some form of large quarterly movements in the technological frontier. Some have collective shocks to the marginal utility of leisure. Other models have large quarterly shocks to the depreciation rate in the capital stock (in order to generate high asset price volatilities)..."
11.4.10
8.4.10
False Alarms
Most flu and public-health experts consider the WHO to have been overly alarmist. The decision in April 2009 to raise the pandemic flu threat to the penultimate level, Phase 5 (“Pandemic Imminent”), already raced far ahead of the accumulated data, so the Phase 6 declaration in June revealed the organization’s paradigm to be fundamentally flawed. A warning system based solely on how widely a virus has spread, but that does not consider the nature and severity of the illness it causes, would classify as “pandemics” not only seasonal flu, but also the frequent but largely inconsequential outbreaks of virus-caused colds and gastroenteritis, for example. (The WHO has never explained why these obvious examples do not meet their criteria.)
5.4.10
Defining Debt Thresholds
Reinhart & Rogoff (2010), Growth in a Time of Debt, found:
First, the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of GDP. Above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by one percent, and average growth falls considerably more. We find that the threshold for public debt is similar in advanced and emerging economies.
Second, emerging markets face lower thresholds for external debt (public and private)—which is usually denominated in a foreign currency. When external debt reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth declines by about two percent; for higher levels, growth rates are roughly cut in half.
Third, there is no apparent contemporaneous link between inflation and public debt levels for the advanced countries as a group (some countries, such as the United States, have experienced higher inflation when debt/GDP is high.) The story is entirely different for emerging markets, where inflation rises sharply as debt increases.
First, the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for debt/GDP ratios below a threshold of 90 percent of GDP. Above 90 percent, median growth rates fall by one percent, and average growth falls considerably more. We find that the threshold for public debt is similar in advanced and emerging economies.
Second, emerging markets face lower thresholds for external debt (public and private)—which is usually denominated in a foreign currency. When external debt reaches 60 percent of GDP, annual growth declines by about two percent; for higher levels, growth rates are roughly cut in half.
Third, there is no apparent contemporaneous link between inflation and public debt levels for the advanced countries as a group (some countries, such as the United States, have experienced higher inflation when debt/GDP is high.) The story is entirely different for emerging markets, where inflation rises sharply as debt increases.
2.4.10
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